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One expects those who lead organisations to affect their performance. If not why would 
organisations spend so much time and money appointing and incentivising their leaders? 
Yet there is little evidence establishing a causal link between leaders and organisational 
performance. Using game-by-game linked employer-employee data for professional 
football in four countries over fifteen seasons we compare the performance of teams after 
they have sacked their Head Coach with spells where the Head Coach remains in post. We 
undertake a similar exercise comparing performance after a Head Coach quits with that 
of teams where the Head Coach remains in post. We deal with the endogeneity of Coach 
departures using entropy balancing to reweight teams’ performance prior to the departure 
of a Coach so that trends in team performance prior to the departure match spells which 
ended with a Coach remaining in post. Consistent with theory, Head Coach quits have little 
or no impact on team performance whereas teams who fire their Head Coach experience 
small but statistically significant improvements in team performance, although this positive 
impact is confined to circumstances in which a team holds onto the new Coach having 
sacked the previous Coach. Our results lend support to the proposition that teams can 
benefit from Head Coach turnover, firing them when it is optimal to do so, and replacing 
a Head Coach during the offseason.
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Across a range of disciplines there is a strong prior that leaders affect performance. In 
military history, leaders on the battlefield are credited for victories and blamed for defeats 
linked to their strategies and tactics. Economists have long maintained that the person who 
leads an organisation can have a substantial effect on its productivity. This is because the 
quality of leaders’ decision-making and leaders’ own productivity have profound 
implications for the way the organization is run and thus the productivity of those further 
down the corporate hierarchy (Rosen, 1990). Lazear et al. (2015) confirm this to be true; an 
average boss adds roughly 1.75 times more to output than an average worker, with peer 
effects paling into economic insignificance relative to the effects of bosses.  
 
It has, however, been very difficult to identify a causal impact of managers on performance 
outcomes because managers are not randomly assigned to organizations and changes in 
corporate leadership are usually endogenous. For this reason, some analysts have relied on 
unforeseen death or hospitalisation episodes to identify the effects of leaders on performance. 
Bennedsen et al. (2012) use hospitalization episodes to identify the effects of CEOs on 
corporate performance while Besley et al. (2011) use the sudden death of heads of state to 
establish the importance of leaders' education for growth in countries' gross domestic 
product. 
 
In this paper we focus on the role of the Head Coach in determining sports teams’ 
performance. The role of the Head Coach can vary across sports and even within a sport 
across countries. But in our setting of professional football, they typically have the power to 
recruit football players to the squad, appoint their backroom and support staff, pick the team 
for each game, and decide on match tactics. It seems reasonable to conjecture, therefore, that 
Head Coaches play a crucial role in determining team performance. Yet the literature finds 
little evidence of a positive performance effect following a change in Head Coach. This 
seems somewhat surprising since hiring is costly to firms and club owners should, in 
principle, have the information required to ensure a good person-job match since weekly 
football matches provide regular updates on the quality of potential candidates.   
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Using a large, rich data set on Head Coaches from the top two tiers of four European countries 
over the seasons 2000/01 to 2014/15, we use entropy balancing to estimate the effects of a 
change in Head Coach on team performance measured as points achieved in league games 
played. In contrast to most of the literature, we find some positive effects of a Head Coach 
change following a Head Coach dismissal, though the result is sensitive to the way we define 
our follow up period. There is little or no performance return when a Head Coach quits. We 
argue that this is precisely what one would anticipate from theory. Previous studies have not 
been able to make this distinction between dismissals and quits or, if they have, their sample 
sizes have been insufficient to provide the necessary statistical power to identify Coach 
effects.    
 
In Section Two, we review the literature on Head Coaches and football team performance, 
identifying the ways in which our paper builds on the existing literature. In Section Three we 
present our data and estimation techniques. Section Four presents the results before 
concluding in Section Five. 
 
2. Theory and Empirical Evidence 
 
In the standard model of employment relationships, workers are hired when the match-
specific surplus generated for the firm exceeds the costs of hire. Termination of the contract 
will occur through dismissal by the employer (often termed "layoff"), or a quit by the worker, 
where the value of that match for one or both parties falls below the value of an outside option 
(Farber, 1999). In football, club owners can update their information on Head Coach 
performance with the results from each game, which tend to happen on average once a week 
during the football season. This provides them with an opportunity to consider Head Coach 
performance relative to expectations on an almost continual basis, something that is harder 
to do in most firms where principals only receive reports of executive performance in the 
annual financial accounts, while monitoring executive performance may prove costly. 
Football club owners act on this information: Bryson et al. (2020) find that dismissals 
accounted for over 70 per cent of all Head Coach departures and that the gap between team 
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performance and expected performance (captured by betting odds) is a strong predictor of 
dismissals.   
 
For the football club, the outside option is an alternative Head Coach. If Head Coaches are 
heterogeneous in ability then teams should be able to replace a departing Coach with a better 
one. Muehlheusser et al. (2016) confirm that there is substantial heterogeneity in Head Coach 
ability in the German “Bundesliga” and that team performance varies according to the ability 
of the in-coming Coach. However, there are a number of reasons why owners may be unable 
to improve team performance through the recruitment of a new Coach. First, while Head 
Coaches are heterogeneous in ability it will be difficult for club owners to identify which are 
the more talented among them. Their past performance may be attributable to factors other 
than ability, including luck, so it is not possible to read off Coach talent directly from the 
performance of clubs they have managed. Second, teams may be constrained in the talent 
they can attract. Theory suggests inefficient hiring in talent markets whereby mediocre 
workers are re-hired in the face of risk associated with appraising the talent of workers that 
are new to an industry (Tervio, 2009). This market failure arises where talent is industry-
specific, is only revealed on the job and, once revealed, becomes public information. More 
productive firms hire those revealed to be high-ability whereas less productive firms must 
experiment with untested new workers. Where there is insufficient discovery of new talent 
firms tend to re-hire some workers known to be mediocre. Peeters et al. (2016) confirm that 
this market failure exists among Head Coaches in professional football in England. Third, it 
is uncertain a priori just how much of the "talent" Head Coaches possess is generalisable and 
how much is team-specific. If there is a large job-match specific component, performing well 
in one setting may not translate to good performance in a new setting. 
 
For the Head Coach, the outside option comes in the form of alternative employment. Clubs 
searching for a new Head Coach have three possible options: recruit from the pool of 
unattached Coaches, promote from within, or poach another club’s Head Coach. The latter 
involves a Head Coach quitting their current post to take up their new job, and the recruiting 
club is likely to have to pay a release clause to begin talks. One would assume that better or 
over performing Head Coaches are the primary targets for recruiting clubs. However, the 
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effect on the performance of the club losing their Head Coach is unclear since the clubs 
would not necessarily have planned for this event (unlike a dismissal) and had no intentions 
to let their current Coach leave. It is therefore unclear, a priori, what impact a Head Coach 
quit will have on team performance.  
 
In their review of the recent literature on Head Coaches and football team performance, Van 
Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) identify eleven studies published since 2000 analysing the period 
1993-2010 spanning six countries. None of them identify a positive effect of an incoming 
Coach following a Coach dismissal. However, there are some important limitations to the 
studies reviewed. First, with the exception of Dobson and Goddard (2011), they rely on a 
small number of Coach dismissal observations, and typically in a single league. Second, they 
tend to report changes over relatively short periods of time (usually four games) which may 
be insufficient to pick up performance changes if Head Coaches take some time to "make 
their mark", which appears likely given the need to adjust to a new environment and alter the 
composition of the team through hires and fires. Third, the studies rely on difference-in-
difference estimates that do not provide a convincing counterfactual to the dismissal spells.  
 
Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) address some of these issues. In particular, they deploy a 
nearest neighbour matching strategy using the gap between team performance and expected 
performance (using betting odds) to match team spells with dismissals against team spells 
for the same football team that experienced similar patterns in performance and expected 
performance but did not switch Head Coach. This strategy offers a much more plausible 
counterfactual against which to judge the performance effects of an in-coming Head Coach. 
They find performance improves after Coach dismissal, but the same improvement is 
observed in counterfactual cases, leading the authors to conclude that they are simply 
observing "a regression to the mean phenomenon" (p. 602). However, their study also suffers 
from small sample sizes, something that particularly affects their ability to estimate models 
for the subset of cases where Head Coaches quit. They also combine estimates for short and 
long follow-up spells without identifying the short and long-run effects of a Coach switch.  
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Madum (2016) also investigates team performance after Head Coach departures with a 
nearest neighbour matching estimator. The matching estimator includes recent performance 
of the team and its opponent, as well as their league ranking, but not expected performance 
derived from betting odds. Exploiting game-level data in the top division of Danish football 
over 19 seasons he finds teams improve their performance after firing a Coach, relative to 
counterfactual scenarios, but the performance only improves in home games. This finding is 
similar to Tena and Forrest (2007) for Spain although they did not use matching methods.1 
Madum also shows that the effect is apparent only for those teams that fired Coaches (the 
average treatment-on-the-treated effect) but that the effect would have been absent among 
the non-treated, a finding that suggests team owners behave optimally when deciding 
whether to dismiss poorly performing Coaches. 
 
Since Head Coaches in professional football typically have the power to recruit football 
players to the squad and backroom support staff, pick the team for each game, and decide on 
match tactics, it would not be surprising to find that teams who fire poorly performing 
Coaches see performance improve with an in-coming Coach. Yet this is not what is found in 
Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) nor in most of the literature. Madum is one of the few 
exceptions. Furthermore, if owners are behaving optimally as principals in firing poorly 
performing agents we would not expect the same effects when estimating treatment-on-the-
non-treated. This is precisely what Madum finds. However, both Van Ours and Van Tuijl 
(2016) and Madum (2016) are constrained in estimating effects of quits due to their small 
sample sizes. Quits are decisions taken by agents, rather than principals, so there might be 
less likelihood that they will be correlated with improvements in team performance, at least 
in the longer term.    
  
Our estimates differ somewhat from those in the literature in three respects. First, our sample 
sizes are large enough to generate sufficient statistical power to be reasonably confident of 
identifying even quite small Head Coach effects on performance for both dismissals and 
quits. Second, we estimate performance outcomes over a longer period (20 games) to 
 
1 In contrast, Muehlheusser et al. (2016) find performance improvements among German teams are driven by 
away matches. 
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establish whether any effects of a Coach change differ in the short and longer term. Third, 
we use entropy balancing to construct counterfactual spells to those ending in quits or 
dismissals. This technique, described in detail in Section Three, has not been used previously 
in the literature.  
 
We test the hypothesis that fires result in performance improvements, not withstanding the 
caveats outlined above, but quits are less likely to do so. Because we track Head Coaches 
over long periods of time, we are able to compare and contrast short-run and medium-run 
performance effects, as well as effects across seasons. This distinction between shorter- and 
longer-run causal impacts is important in picking up quite separate effects of Head Coach 
changes on team performance. The short-run effect is the "bump" in performance that is 
attributable to simply making a change. There are two aspects to this. The first is the one 
football pundits often refer to, namely the potential motivational impact of a new Coach on 
current players who are seeking to impress the new Coach in order to cement their place in 
the team. The second element that might have an immediate impact on performance is simply 
the fact of having made a change. Levitt (2016) finds there are happiness benefits of making 
life-changing decisions when determined by the toss of a coin - that is, even when the 
decision is made based on a random event.  Analogously, it seems reasonable to assume that 
a simple change in Coach - regardless of the in-coming Coach's quality or the circumstances 
surrounding his appointment - may result in improvements in team performance. Both these 
"bump" effects might apply to scenarios in which a Coach has quit as well as dismissals.  
 
The longer-run causal impact of a change in Head Coach will arise where Coaches benefit 
from on-the-job learning including learning about the new football club, its players and the 
expectations and orientation of the owners. Coaches will also be able to sell unwanted players 
and recruit new ones via the transfer market. Recent studies emphasise the importance of on-
the-job learning for individual worker productivity (e.g. Gaynor et al. (2005) in the health 
economics literature), especially among new hires (de Grip, 2015).2 We look directly at time-
variance in any performance effects.  
 
2 Perhaps the most successful football club manager of all time, Sir Alex Ferguson, described the time it took 
to "build a club" (https://hbr.org/2013/10/fergusons-formula).  Yet he was not successful in his early years as 
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Our study is also distinctive because, to our knowledge, all other studies to date focus on 
single countries. Our data are from four countries (Germany, Italy, Spain and France). We 
know from other studies that the labour markets in these countries operate quite differently 
due to differences in employment protection, for example (European Commission, 2013). In 
football, differences in Head Coach labour markets may emerge due to variations in 
governance structures across countries, the financing of clubs, media attention, and team 
ownership. Examination of these differences is beyond the scope of the present paper, 
however.   
 
3. Data and Empirical Approach 
 
Our data set consists of all games from the top two divisions of four major European football 
leagues (France, Germany, Italy and Spain) over the period 2001/02 to 2014/15 for which 
we can precisely ascertain the start and end dates of managerial spells.3 This period covers 
273 teams, with 769 individual Coaches taking charge of games for those teams. Coaching 
tenures were hand-collected from Wikipedia, supported by online newspaper sources from 
each country. In line with literature such as van Ours and van Tuijl (2016), we exclude 
caretaker spells where an interim Coach took over management of a team prior to a 
permanent appointment. It could be that an interim candidate performs well enough to be 
given the job on a full-time basis; in this case we only consider the date from when they were 
permanently appointed. In aggregate, we have 1,327 fires and 533 quits, which on average 
lasted for 35 (std. dev. = 31) and 60 (std. dev. = 51) games respectively. Table 1 shows the 
 
he recalled in his autobiography: "After the farewell in May 2013, the pivotal moments filled my thoughts. 
Winning that FA Cup third-round tie against Nottingham Forest in January 1990, in which a Mark Robins 
goal sent us on our way to the final when my job was supposedly on the line. Without the FA Cup [final] 
victory over Crystal Palace nearly four years after my arrival, grave doubts would have been raised about my 
suitability for the job. We will never know how close I was to being sacked, because the decision was never 
forced on the United board. But without that triumph at Wembley, the crowds would have shrivelled. 
Disaffection might have swept the club" (Ferguson, 2013). 
 
3 We exclude the English leagues from our analysis since many teams in England operate with a Manager 
rather than a Head Coach. Typically, a Manager will be involved in the same roles as a Head Coach (coaching 
the team, picking the matchday squads, motivating players etc.) with the added responsibility of recruitment 
and overseeing the youth teams. In European football, teams now typically operate with a Head Coach and a 
Director of Football or General Manager taking on the other responsibilities with input from the Head Coach.  
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number of dismissals and quits per season, aggregated over the leagues in our data. 
Dismissals exceed quits and there appears to be a rising trend in both dismissals and quits. 
The increased firing rate may be a consequence of growing revenue differences between 
league positions generally in European football.4 This increase in reward for success was 
proposed by d’Addona and Kind (2014) as an explanation for increased Head Coach turnover 
in English football in their study covering the post-war period up to 2008.  
 
Table 1: Frequency of Exits (by type) per season 
Season Dismissals Quits 
2000-01 70 20 
2001-02 61 34 
2002-03 63 26 
2003-04 71 43 
2004-05 63 36 
2005-06 74 31 
2006-07 79 39 
2007-08 69 34 
2008-09 95 44 
2009-10 112 29 
2010-11 99 38 
2011-12 111 39 
2012-13 99 36 
2013-14 110 28 
2014-15 151 56 
Total 1327 533 
 
Figure 1 shows the timing of dismissals and quits respectively as the season progresses. Time 
lapsed is measured monthly (as opposed to say, number of games) since the different 
countries and different tiers within a country have different season lengths.5 There are large 
spikes in Coach departures at the end of the season (usually May, though a season 
occasionally extends into June). This makes sense on several counts. The off season is a 
 
4 Prominent amongst the sources of revenue differences between league positions is the growth of UEFA 
Champions’ League revenues for the top three or four teams that qualify for this competition from our four 
sample Leagues. These revenues have grown substantially over time prompting increased investment in 
playing squads by aspiring teams (Green et al., 2015).  
5 The number of teams in our leagues per season varies between 18 and 24, and as such season length varies 
between 34 and 46 games. Due to restructuring of leagues, bankruptcy and or disqualification of clubs, season 
length may vary from year to year.   
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period with no games other than pre-season friendlies and coincides with the summer transfer 
window. Together, these give a new appointment the best opportunity to work with their new 
squad and implement any changes they deem necessary. This could entail working with the 
current squad of players, honing their skills, developing a playing style and making use of 
the transfer market to recruit new players to the team. Moreover, the off-season is when many 
Head Coach contracts expire or are reviewed by the board of directors, so teams wishing to 
dismiss their Coach may find it best to wait until contract expiry, rather than sacking mid-
season which may require a substantial severance payment to the Coach.  
 
 
During the season dismissals tend to peak in mid-season when some leagues have a winter 
break. Quits on the other hand show little pattern over time. It appears that many clubs 
reassess their prospects during the winter break and are more likely to fire their Head Coaches 
at this juncture than at other points in the season. Importantly for our analysis, the two 
histograms give a preliminary suggestion that the statistical processes driving Head Coach 
fires and quits could well be different.   
 
Figure 2 shows average team performance before and after Coach changes, again with fires 
and quits considered separately. We assess team performance across the whole sample, up to 
20 games before a Coach change and up to 20 games after the change, with team performance 
Figure 1: Frequency of Coach exits by month 
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being measured as Mean Points Per Game. 20 games was chosen as this is approximately 
half a season, though for smaller leagues with shorter seasons this will be a little longer than 
half a season. The blue line refers to performance during a quit spell, and the red line refers 




















Prior to dismissals, team performance drops as indicated by the decline in the line 
representing fires as game number zero approaches. This is akin to the Ashenfelter Dip, 
something one needs to be mindful of when making over-time comparisons before-and-after 
Head Coach dismissals (Bruinshoofd and ter Weel, 2003).6 Post-dismissal team performance 
recovers and stabilises at a level close to that for the pre-period. In contrast, there is less 
 
6 The Ashenfelter Dip, first observed by Orley Ashenfelter (1978), describes the drop in the earnings of 
participants in job training programs in the year before entry. Thus, a simple before and after comparison of 
the effect of job training programs on earnings is likely to be overestimate the true effect.   
Figure 2: Points Per Game before and after a Coaching change 
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evidence of a dip in performance prior to quits, nor much of a change in performance after a 
quit. 
 
As de Paulo and Scoppa (2012) and van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) argue, the recovery in 
team performance following a Coach firing could simply be the result of regression to the 
mean. The key question that we address below in more formal regression analysis is whether 
we can discern any causal impact of Head Coach turnover on team performance after 
accounting for the endogeneity of Head Coach change and other confounding factors.  
 
Our empirical approach begins by specifying a naïve OLS regression as follows: 
 
𝑌𝑖𝑗𝑘 = 𝑋𝑖𝑗𝑘
′ 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑑𝑖𝑗𝑘 + 𝜖𝑖𝑗𝑘 (1) 
 
where the subscripts are denoted as i for team, j for game and k for season. This is our 
outcome model, where the dependent variable, Yijk, is points per game: teams get three points 
for a win, one for a draw and none for a defeat. We run models for points obtained for spells 
of the next single game through to longer outcome spells of up to 20 games. Match results 
and betting odds (which we make use of later) were provided by www.football-data.co.uk. 
dijk is our main variable of interest; a dummy variable to indicate whether there has been a 
coach change. Because we have two possible types of exit (quit or dismissal), we run the 
above specification twice to account for this, taking out coaching tenures that end in the other 
type of exit (i.e. we drop spells that end in a quit when analysing dismissals and vice versa). 
Naturally, our test that a coach change has a positive effect on performance is then a t-test of 
the null of β = 0 in equation (1). Xijk is a vector of control variables which includes 
information on previous team performance, captured by points per game over the previous 
10 fixtures, and performance relative to expected performance (called Surprise, described 
below). We also include opposition form, measured by the opponent’s league positions, and 
home advantage, measured by the proportion of home games over the follow up period. To 
complete (1), εijk is a random error term. Throughout our estimations, standard errors are 
clustered at the team level.  
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Following van Ours and van Tuijl (2016) we incorporate a measure of Surprise which is the 
difference between actual and expected performance. Performance above or below or 
expectations in any given match, or indeed across multiple games are likely to affect future 
performance.7 Teams earn three points for a win, and one point for a draw, thus expected 
points in a given match is computed as:  
 
𝐸(𝑃𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠) = (3 ∗ 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝑊𝑖𝑛) + 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏. 𝑜𝑓 𝐷𝑟𝑎𝑤          (2) 
 
where the probabilities are derived from bookmakers’ betting odds. Surprise is then actual 
points minus expected points. Naturally, a Surprise value of 0 indicates that a team performed 
as expected, with this being reflected by the betting market. We include Surprise in the most 
recent game, cumulative (total) surprise over games lagged two to five and cumulative (total) 
surprise over games lagged six to ten to capture any longer runs of good or bad form.  
 
The difficulty in relying on OLS estimation of Head Coach changes on team performance is 
that Head Coach changes are not random. Indeed, they are likely to be endogenous with 
respect to team performance. To put this another way, it is likely that only the poor or 
underperforming teams sack their coach, as is apparent in Figure 2. Consequently, we cannot 
infer what would have happened to a team's performance in the absence of a Head Coach 
change by comparing the performance of teams that did and did not make a change. De Paolo 
and Scoppa (2012), Van Ours and Van Tuijl (2016) and Besters et al. (2016) found positive 
and significant effects of Head Coach dismissals on team performance for Italian, Dutch and 
English football, respectively, from naïve OLS estimates only for these effects to become 
statistical insignificant when they compared performance with a matched comparator group. 
 
We adopt a different approach to obtain the causal impact of Head Coach changes on team 
performance, namely Entropy Balancing (Hainmueller, 2012), implemented by the Stata 
command ebalance (Hainmueller and Zu, 2013). This is a data pre-processing method that 
reweights observational data to achieve covariate balance in treatment and control groups. It 
 
7 As well as predicting future outcomes, Surprise is a determinant of a team dismissing their Head Coach. 
This is a point we come to during our discussions on covariate balancing.  
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does so by ensuring that the means, variances, skewness (and theoretically even higher 
moments) are equal for the covariates in the treatment and control groups. These weights are 
then simply used in a weighted version of the OLS regression described in (1). The weights 
ensure covariate balance across treated and control spells such that Head Coach departures 
are akin to a random process. Any selection into treatment is stripped out of the outcome 
equation (1). Estimates of our unweighted OLS regression can be found in the Appendix.  
 
More formally, following the notation in Hainmueller and Zu (2013), entropy balancing can 
be thought of as a generalised propensity score weighting approach to form a counterfactual 
mean as follows: 
 
𝑬(𝑌(0) | 𝐷 = 1̂ ) =  
∑ 𝑌𝑖𝑤𝑖{𝑖|𝐷=0}
∑ 𝑤𝑖{𝑖|𝐷=0
  (3) 
 
where wi is the entropy balancing weight for each observation in the control sample. The 
weights are chosen by the following scheme to minimise the entropy distance metric, defined 
by the loss function h(.), which we can think of as being a measure of dissimilarity between 




𝐻(𝑤) =  ∑ ℎ(𝑤𝑖)𝑖|𝐷=0    (4) 
Subject to the following constraints 
∑ 𝑤𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑖(𝑋𝑖) = 𝑚𝑟            𝑟 ∈ 1, … , 𝑅𝑖|𝐷=0   (5) 
∑ 𝑤𝑖 = 1𝑖|𝐷=0       (6) 
𝑤𝑖 ≥ 0         𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑎𝑙𝑙 𝑖 𝑠𝑢𝑐ℎ 𝑡ℎ𝑎𝑡 𝐷 = 0  (7) 
 
Where cri(Xi)=mr describes a set of R balance constraints imposed on the covariate moments 
in the reweighted control group. The second constraint is arbitrary, and the weights can sum 
to any constant. In the Stata procedure, R is set to 3 meaning we balance covariates on the 
mean, variance and skewness. Tables A4 and A5 in the appendix show these moments of our 
treatment and control groups before and after applying our entropy balancing weights.  
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Entropy Balancing has several advantages, both in a practical and an econometric sense, over 
more conventional weighting methods (such as Inverse Probability Weighting Regression 
Adjustment). From the researcher’s point of view, the scheme removes the need for the 
continual iterative process of running a propensity score model and checking for covariate 
balance, not to mention the concern of mis-specifying the treatment model. Moreover, all 
observations receive a weight, meaning the whole sample is available for our estimations.8 
Zhao and Percival (2017) also show that entropy balancing possesses the attractive property 
of being doubly robust, even though no treatment model is actually estimated, while also 
producing treatment effects that are within the range of observed outcomes.   
 
The covariates we balance on are all variables that, at least in theory, should predict Head 
Coach departures. We follow Bryson et al. (2020) in our selection of covariates that affect 
departures, since they are also liable to influence performance outcomes. These capture a 
combination of team form, coaching characteristics and season progress. For an analysis of 
variables that are associated with both types of exit, see Table A3 in the Appendix, which 
displays the results of a multinomial logit regression. Team form variables include mean 
points per game over the last 10 games, league position (where position is captured as rank 
across both tiers per country) and the final league position of the team in the previous season. 
Since owners’ (and stakeholders) expectations about performance (as well as actual 
performance) are likely to play a role in coaching departures, we also include the lagged 
cumulative Surprise variables as discussed earlier. Should performance slip below some 
acceptable level in the eyes of the principal, which will include knowledge about opponent 
quality, then the team may look to replace the Head Coach (van Ours and van Tuijl, 2016). 
A negative Surprise value is a likely signal of a poorly performing Head Coach.   
 
Our measures of Head Coach characteristics include tenure at the current team (measured in 
number of games), experience (years since first coaching job), age and its square, the number 
of previous Head Coach spells, dummy variables capturing previous successes and failures 
as a coach (previous promotions, previous cup winners, and a previous relegation), and 
 
8 This means no observations are lost through the enforcement of common support, as is often the case in 
propensity score matching. 
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dummy variables capturing some kind of connection with the club, namely whether the coach 
was hired from within and whether the coach is an ex-player at the club. The latter two 
variables, along with tenure, can be thought of as club specific measures of human capital, 
while the other measures capture more general human capital i.e. skills and or experiences 
that are not specific to any one club. Finally, our measures of season progress (in line with 
Figure 1) include the proportion of games remaining (to account for differences in season 
length) and whether the departure occurred after the last game of the season. Descriptive 
statistics of our covariates and selected outcomes are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Outcomes      
Mean Points per game Next 1 Game 65,998 1.391 1.293 0 3 
Mean Points per game Next 5 Games 65,339 1.390 0.620 0 3 
Mean Points per game Next 10 Games 64,494 1.391 0.481 0 3 
Mean Points per game Next 15 Games 63,626 1.391 0.423 0.133 3 
Mean Points per game Next 20 Games 62,751 1.391 0.390 0.150 2.900 
Team Performance      
Surprise t-1 66,157 0.014 1.198 -2.707 2.797 
Surprise t-2 to t-5 66,157 0.061 2.371 -8.269 8.277 
Surprise t-6 to t-10 66,157 0.080 2.649 -9.681 9.760 
Mean Points per game Prev 10 Games 66,157 1.395 0.479 0 3 
Position 66,157 19.927 12.524 1 48 
Last Season Position 66,157 28.377 21.872 1 66 
Coach Characteristics      
Tenure (n games) 66,157 44.653 47.062 1 441 
Experience (years) 66,157 11.475 7.707 0 44 
Age 66,157 48.439 6.582 30.212 73.739 
N Prev HC Jobs 66,157 4.395 3.888 0 23 
Previous Promotion 66,157 0.525 0.499 0 1 
Previous Cup 66,157 0.195 0.397 0 1 
Previous Relegation 66,157 0.268 0.443 0 1 
Internal 66,157 0.138 0.345 0 1 
Ex Player 66,157 0.160 0.366 0 1 
Season Progress      
Proportion of Games Remaining 66,157 0.484 0.285 0 0.978 
Last Game of Season 66,157 0.025 0.155 0 1 
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Our preferred variants of the entropy balanced models include team fixed effects, thus 
focusing on comparisons of team performance within team over time. In doing so we avoid 
biases in estimates of Head Coach departures arising from fixed unobservable differences 
across teams. We can also include season fixed effects in our estimations. Our baseline 
models compare spells ending in either a Head Coach quit or dismissal (at time t=0), relative 
to counterfactual spells which did not end in a Head Coach departure, where we follow 
performance for a further 20 games (t=1 to t=20), regardless of whether there are subsequent 
Head Coach changes in the period after t=0. It is arguable that football results should count 
when estimating the impact of a Coach dismissal or quit, even if there is subsequent Coach 
turnover in the outcome spell. In a later analysis, we restrict our analyses to ‘clean’ spells of 
games where no subsequent Head Coach change occurs. This facilitates an assessment of the 
long-term performance of the initial Head Coach change, where that performance is 
permitted to develop. However, it is also arguable that in dropping spells with a subsequent 
Head Coach change, we are truncating the sample based on a potentially endogenous variable 
i.e. whether team owners choose to retain the Coach for another 20 games, since this will 
partly reflect how well the new Head coach is performing during that period. Indeed, a simple 
probit regression reveals that good performance (both absolute and relative to expectations), 
whether the team is promoted or relegated and the proportion of games remaining are all 
strong predictors of clean spells.  
 
Unlike most other studies which confine analysis to within-season changes in Head Coach, 
we allow team performance history to straddle seasons and we also include between-season 
Coach changes in our analysis. We test the sensitivity of this by running analyses with and 
without closed season Coach changes, as it is possible that those changes that occur in the 
closed season are qualitatively different to those that occur within season. For example, they 
may include a larger number of contract non-renewals. There are not enough within season 
quits to extract any meaningful results, hence our soul focus here will be on dismissals. Of 
the 1,327 total dismissals, 883 occurred within season, and the remaining 444 occurred 
during the offseason. Our spells of games may also include instances of teams being 
promoted and relegated. Of course, a win is worth three points and a draw one point in both 
the first and second tier, but due to the quality of opponents in the top tier, a win is likely 
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harder to come by for promoted teams. Equally, a relegated team should find it easier to pick 
up points in the lower tier. This could play on owner’s expectations, and so we check the 
robustness of our results by taking out teams who are playing in their first season after a 




4.1 Baseline Entropy Balance Models 
 
We start by presenting our baseline models, using the entropy balanced weights as specified 
by the Stata routine in a weighted version of equation (1), including team and season fixed 
effects in various specifications. Table 3 displays the results for dismissals, while Table 4 
displays the results for quits. Both sets of results suggest that team performance does not 
significantly improve for any sustained run of games following either a dismissal or a quit. 
The effect of including of team fixed effects is to reduce the point estimates. Including team 
fixed effects means we are relying on spells of games within team to obtain our counterfactual 
spells. If these omitted differences are correlated with the tendency to change Coaches, then 
the estimates without team fixed effects will be biased, with the team fixed effects soaking 
up a great deal of the across team differences. In practical terms, any positive effects of a 
coaching change may be limited to a select number of teams.     
 
Of course, these are all average effects, but within that average will lie a range of outcomes, 
with some teams benefitting from changing Coach, while other will likely suffer. Even if 
teams know the average effect is negligible, they may be attracted by the small probability 
of a successful Coach change. On the other hand, this zero average effect could be consistent 
with the scapegoat hypothesis of fan disgruntlement and pressure (e.g. Tena and Forrest, 
2007), in that a change is made simply to appease disgruntled fans, even though performance 
is unlikely to improve. Nevertheless, we feel that jumping to the conclusion of ‘Head 
Coaches make no difference’ on the basis of these results is possibly a little short sighted 
given our theoretical discussion outlined in Section 2. Hence, we offer alternative 
specifications to look at this in more depth.  
Table 3: Entropy Balanced OLS (Dismissals) 
 
 no FE team FE season FE N Adj. R2 





1 -0.008 (0.043) 0.011 (0.045) -0.016 (0.042) 65,603 0.084 0.144 0.089 
2 0.032 (0.033) 0.028 (0.035) 0.030 (0.033) 65,440 0.056 0.112 0.061 
3 0.048* (0.028) 0.039 (0.030) 0.047* (0.028) 65,275 0.074 0.137 0.079 
4 0.038 (0.025) 0.028 (0.026) 0.037 (0.025) 65,110 0.073 0.143 0.078 
5 0.015 (0.022) 0.005 (0.023) 0.014 (0.022) 64,944 0.086 0.160 0.090 
6 0.004 (0.021) -0.007 (0.021) 0.003 (0.020) 64,778 0.092 0.181 0.096 
7 -0.007 (0.019) -0.021 (0.019) -0.008 (0.019) 64,612 0.100 0.198 0.106 
8 -0.006 (0.019) -0.019 (0.018) -0.006 (0.018) 64,443 0.103 0.210 0.107 
9 -0.015 (0.018) -0.031* (0.018) -0.014 (0.018) 64,273 0.109 0.227 0.114 
10 -0.002 (0.017) -0.019 (0.016) -0.001 (0.017) 64,101 0.124 0.242 0.129 
11 -0.002 (0.016) -0.016 (0.015) -0.001 (0.016) 63,929 0.127 0.256 0.132 
12 -0.006 (0.016) -0.021 (0.014) -0.006 (0.016) 63,755 0.134 0.269 0.139 
13 0.001 (0.015) -0.013 (0.013) 0.001 (0.015) 63,582 0.134 0.283 0.140 
14 0.005 (0.015) -0.009 (0.013) 0.005 (0.015) 63,409 0.145 0.298 0.152 
15 0.005 (0.015) -0.009 (0.013) 0.005 (0.015) 63,235 0.147 0.312 0.154 
16 0.006 (0.015) -0.009 (0.013) 0.006 (0.015) 63,059 0.147 0.320 0.155 
17 0.011 (0.015) -0.004 (0.012) 0.011 (0.014) 62,885 0.153 0.327 0.160 
18 0.011 (0.014) -0.006 (0.012) 0.011 (0.014) 62,711 0.154 0.333 0.162 
19 0.017 (0.014) 0.000 (0.011) 0.017 (0.014) 62,535 0.155 0.342 0.163 
20 0.016 (0.014) -0.002 (0.011) 0.017 (0.014) 62,360 0.154 0.352 0.162 















 no FE team FE season FE N Adj. R2 





1 0.020 (0.066) -0.031 (0.073) 0.022 (0.067) 65,048 0.152 0.281 0.157 
2 -0.002 (0.050) -0.008 (0.054) -0.007 (0.050) 64,888 0.092 0.232 0.100 
3 0.023 (0.048) 0.011 (0.051) 0.019 (0.048) 64,725 0.100 0.253 0.103 
4 0.004 (0.042) 0.000 (0.043) 0.004 (0.042) 64,561 0.105 0.269 0.110 
5 0.003 (0.038) -0.010 (0.039) 0.005 (0.039) 64,396 0.113 0.279 0.117 
6 0.016 (0.035) 0.005 (0.036) 0.016 (0.036) 64,232 0.116 0.301 0.119 
7 0.017 (0.033) 0.003 (0.033) 0.017 (0.033) 64,069 0.126 0.326 0.130 
8 0.012 (0.031) -0.002 (0.031) 0.011 (0.032) 63,902 0.138 0.361 0.141 
9 0.006 (0.030) -0.013 (0.030) 0.006 (0.030) 63,736 0.141 0.367 0.145 
10 0.000 (0.029) -0.020 (0.029) 0.000 (0.029) 63,569 0.161 0.398 0.165 
11 -0.009 (0.028) -0.032 (0.027) -0.008 (0.028) 63,398 0.166 0.408 0.171 
12 -0.003 (0.026) -0.024 (0.025) -0.001 (0.026) 63,228 0.178 0.423 0.183 
13 0.004 (0.026) -0.019 (0.025) 0.006 (0.026) 63,058 0.183 0.435 0.189 
14 0.005 (0.025) -0.018 (0.024) 0.006 (0.025) 62,888 0.197 0.452 0.203 
15 -0.003 (0.024) -0.022 (0.023) -0.002 (0.024) 62,714 0.198 0.452 0.202 
16 -0.003 (0.023) -0.022 (0.023) -0.002 (0.023) 62,542 0.205 0.460 0.209 
17 -0.008 (0.023) -0.025 (0.022) -0.008 (0.023) 62,371 0.210 0.470 0.214 
18 -0.006 (0.022) -0.018 (0.021) -0.005 (0.022) 62,200 0.224 0.481 0.228 
19 -0.010 (0.022) -0.022 (0.021) -0.008 (0.022) 62,030 0.228 0.489 0.232 
20 -0.008 (0.021) -0.022 (0.020) -0.006 (0.021) 61,856 0.228 0.498 0.233 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses (clustered at the Team level) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
4.2 Alternative Specifications 
 
4.2.2 Clean Follow Up Spell 
 
We define a ‘clean’ follow up spell as one where no subsequent Coaching change occurs 
after the initial change at t=0. In other words, we are considering teams who stick with their 
new Coach. Under this definition, both quits and dismissals now show evidence of positive 
returns after changing a Head Coach (Tables 5 and 6), a result which also holds with the 
inclusion of team fixed effects.9 Despite the limitations discussed in Section 3 of this 
approach, there is still great value in these estimations, as we are likely capturing an upper 
bound of the effects of a Head Coach change. Given that these teams are likely happy with 
their new appointment, compared to teams who are unhappy and change Coaches again, this 
selection of ‘clean’ spells drops cases where the new appointment has been less successful.  
 
While the results of positive effects of a Head Coach change are particularly evident for 
dismissals, we also observe some positive effects following a quit, though the effects occur 
much later in the follow up period. It could be that a new appointment following a quit takes 
longer to adjust to the new club, if for example they are still appointing their backroom staff 
or figuring out their best team having not had time to plan unlike the situation following a 
dismissal. With that being said, given that in these ‘clean’ follow up spells teams are likely 
happy with their new appointment, regardless of the manner of exit of the previous coach, 
then perhaps we should not be surprised to see longer term improvements to performance 
due to the learning process and adjustment period following a new appointment. This could 
have implications for team hiring policies and the process they go through to select a Head 
Coach. There is no official interview process that teams must go through, and teams often 
have a new appointment lined up even before they have dismissed the incumbent coach. 
Without taking the time to interview and carefully select candidates, it is possible the wrong 
hire is made with a low job match surplus.    
 
9 Spells that last 20 games or fewer represents a fairly sizeable portion of our data. 34% percent of Head 
Coach spells are over by or on the 20th game. Over 13% of coaches don’t even last until the 10th game. These 
short spells are predominantly occurring in Italy and Spain. 






 no FE team FE season FE N Adj. R2 





1 0.013 (0.044) 0.051 (0.045) 0.003 (0.043) 65,461 0.085 0.139 0.090 
2 0.054 (0.034) 0.058 (0.035) 0.051 (0.034) 65,297 0.052 0.107 0.055 
3 0.064** (0.028) 0.056* (0.030) 0.062** (0.029) 65,131 0.071 0.133 0.073 
4 0.071*** (0.025) 0.057** (0.027) 0.070*** (0.025) 64,956 0.069 0.138 0.074 
5 0.056** (0.022) 0.036 (0.023) 0.055** (0.022) 64,783 0.084 0.158 0.088 
6 0.046** (0.021) 0.024 (0.022) 0.045** (0.021) 64,609 0.088 0.179 0.091 
7 0.042** (0.020) 0.019 (0.020) 0.042** (0.020) 64,428 0.096 0.196 0.100 
8 0.041** (0.020) 0.016 (0.019) 0.041** (0.020) 64,253 0.101 0.208 0.104 
9 0.039** (0.019) 0.009 (0.019) 0.039** (0.019) 64,069 0.108 0.229 0.112 
10 0.056*** (0.018) 0.030* (0.017) 0.056*** (0.018) 63,880 0.127 0.255 0.132 
11 0.061*** (0.018) 0.036** (0.016) 0.062*** (0.018) 63,684 0.132 0.270 0.137 
12 0.059*** (0.018) 0.031* (0.016) 0.059*** (0.018) 63,494 0.142 0.285 0.147 
13 0.066*** (0.017) 0.039*** (0.015) 0.066*** (0.017) 63,312 0.147 0.302 0.152 
14 0.072*** (0.017) 0.045*** (0.014) 0.071*** (0.017) 63,128 0.157 0.315 0.162 
15 0.081*** (0.017) 0.051*** (0.015) 0.080*** (0.017) 62,933 0.165 0.332 0.170 
16 0.080*** (0.017) 0.050*** (0.014) 0.080*** (0.017) 62,743 0.165 0.339 0.172 
17 0.091*** (0.017) 0.060*** (0.014) 0.090*** (0.017) 62,551 0.172 0.349 0.178 
18 0.097*** (0.016) 0.063*** (0.013) 0.096*** (0.016) 62,364 0.180 0.360 0.187 
19 0.110*** (0.016) 0.073*** (0.013) 0.109*** (0.016) 62,172 0.186 0.372 0.193 
20 0.112*** (0.015) 0.075*** (0.012) 0.112*** (0.015) 61,980 0.189 0.383 0.195 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses (clustered at the Team level) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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 no FE team FE season FE N Adj. R2 





1 0.043 (0.070) -0.005 (0.077) 0.048 (0.071) 65,003 0.147 0.274 0.154 
2 0.028 (0.053) 0.028 (0.057) 0.023 (0.052) 64,842 0.088 0.229 0.098 
3 0.057 (0.049) 0.050 (0.053) 0.056 (0.049) 64,679 0.095 0.251 0.099 
4 0.029 (0.043) 0.026 (0.044) 0.031 (0.043) 64,512 0.094 0.265 0.099 
5 0.038 (0.040) 0.029 (0.041) 0.042 (0.040) 64,343 0.107 0.287 0.112 
6 0.041 (0.038) 0.032 (0.037) 0.044 (0.038) 64,178 0.109 0.310 0.114 
7 0.036 (0.035) 0.022 (0.034) 0.038 (0.035) 64,011 0.122 0.331 0.128 
8 0.036 (0.033) 0.024 (0.033) 0.038 (0.034) 63,841 0.133 0.360 0.137 
9 0.037 (0.032) 0.018 (0.032) 0.040 (0.032) 63,671 0.134 0.375 0.140 
10 0.024 (0.031) 0.003 (0.030) 0.026 (0.031) 63,503 0.152 0.399 0.157 
11 0.030 (0.029) 0.003 (0.029) 0.031 (0.029) 63,326 0.166 0.409 0.172 
12 0.037 (0.027) 0.008 (0.026) 0.038 (0.027) 63,151 0.176 0.419 0.181 
13 0.053* (0.027) 0.020 (0.026) 0.055** (0.028) 62,974 0.183 0.428 0.188 
14 0.064** (0.026) 0.027 (0.025) 0.064** (0.027) 62,797 0.199 0.447 0.204 
15 0.053** (0.026) 0.023 (0.024) 0.054** (0.026) 62,619 0.198 0.448 0.201 
16 0.064** (0.025) 0.031 (0.024) 0.065** (0.025) 62,439 0.203 0.455 0.205 
17 0.064** (0.025) 0.035 (0.024) 0.064** (0.025) 62,260 0.211 0.466 0.213 
18 0.080*** (0.024) 0.050** (0.023) 0.080*** (0.025) 62,080 0.232 0.476 0.234 
19 0.085*** (0.025) 0.055** (0.023) 0.085*** (0.025) 61,902 0.238 0.493 0.240 
20 0.091*** (0.024) 0.061*** (0.022) 0.091*** (0.024) 61,722 0.238 0.501 0.240 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses (clustered at the Team level) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
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Table 7: Within and Between Season Dismissals 
Mean Points 
Next ... Games 
Within Season Between Season 
no FE team FE N Adj. R2 no FE team FE N Adj. R2 









1 -0.022 (0.049) -0.004 (0.054) 65,364 0.087 0.161 0.104 (0.075) 0.102 (0.083) 64,892 0.095 0.199 
2 0.028 (0.034) 0.021 (0.037) 65,201 0.058 0.127 0.109* (0.058) 0.091 (0.059) 64,732 0.073 0.182 
3 0.024 (0.028) 0.010 (0.030) 65,036 0.070 0.147 0.137*** (0.048) 0.119** (0.049) 64,569 0.113 0.223 
4 0.016 (0.025) 0.002 (0.027) 64,871 0.081 0.164 0.133*** (0.045) 0.105** (0.044) 64,405 0.097 0.220 
5 -0.012 (0.022) -0.025 (0.023) 64,705 0.102 0.183 0.122*** (0.039) 0.084** (0.038) 64,240 0.092 0.213 
6 -0.017 (0.020) -0.031 (0.021) 64,539 0.117 0.210 0.108*** (0.033) 0.070** (0.033) 64,077 0.105 0.233 
7 -0.025 (0.018) -0.040** (0.019) 64,373 0.124 0.216 0.092*** (0.031) 0.048 (0.031) 63,914 0.110 0.246 
8 -0.024 (0.017) -0.036** (0.018) 64,204 0.126 0.221 0.094*** (0.031) 0.049 (0.031) 63,748 0.115 0.268 
9 -0.029* (0.016) -0.042** (0.017) 64,034 0.137 0.234 0.083*** (0.031) 0.036 (0.030) 63,582 0.125 0.291 
10 -0.022 (0.015) -0.035** (0.016) 63,862 0.148 0.244 0.096*** (0.030) 0.047 (0.030) 63,415 0.142 0.311 
11 -0.021 (0.014) -0.031** (0.015) 63,690 0.154 0.256 0.098*** (0.029) 0.045 (0.028) 63,244 0.154 0.328 
12 -0.024* (0.013) -0.034** (0.014) 63,516 0.160 0.268 0.088*** (0.029) 0.040 (0.027) 63,074 0.151 0.333 
13 -0.018 (0.014) -0.026* (0.014) 63,343 0.159 0.275 0.093*** (0.027) 0.043* (0.025) 62,904 0.156 0.350 
14 -0.015 (0.013) -0.023* (0.013) 63,170 0.171 0.291 0.089*** (0.027) 0.040 (0.025) 62,735 0.158 0.357 
15 -0.014 (0.013) -0.022* (0.013) 62,996 0.175 0.302 0.091*** (0.028) 0.041* (0.024) 62,562 0.165 0.378 
16 -0.010 (0.013) -0.018 (0.012) 62,820 0.177 0.307 0.082*** (0.027) 0.032 (0.024) 62,390 0.167 0.392 
17 -0.004 (0.013) -0.012 (0.011) 62,646 0.178 0.310 0.080*** (0.027) 0.033 (0.023) 62,219 0.175 0.399 
18 -0.005 (0.013) -0.015 (0.011) 62,472 0.175 0.314 0.076*** (0.026) 0.031 (0.022) 62,048 0.179 0.407 
19 0.003 (0.013) -0.006 (0.011) 62,296 0.177 0.322 0.076*** (0.026) 0.030 (0.021) 61,878 0.172 0.412 
20 0.002 (0.012) -0.008 (0.011) 62,121 0.175 0.331 0.077*** (0.026) 0.029 (0.021) 61,704 0.174 0.419 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses (clustered at the Team level) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
 
4.2.2 Within and Between Season changes 
 
In Table 7, we distinguish between dismissals that took place during the season (left hand 
side of Table 7), and those that took place between seasons (right hand side). To obtain these 
results, we remove the Last Game of Season variable from the balancing scheme for within 
season dismissals, and Last Game of Season and Season Progress are removed from the 
balancing scheme for the offseason dismissal results. Focusing on mid-season dismissals, 
changing Head Coach appears to make little difference to team performance, while the fixed 
effects model suggests that team performance declines somewhat over games 7-15. If we 
instead focus only on coaching changes during the offseason (following a dismissal), team 
performance improves across the whole follow up period (apart from the first game of the 
season). The fixed effects variant also maintains some significance in the early part of the 
season. This distinction can be explained by Head Coaches being given the time to implement 
their new ideas and methods during pre-season training, as well as having access to the 
summer transfer window, where they can sell unwanted players, and bring in new players to 
improve their squad. Coaches who are hired mid-season are not afforded the opportunity to 
work with their squad without the burden of matches.  
 
4.2.3 Promotions and Relegations 
 
As a final check, we consider the role of promotions and relegations in our estimations. 
Results tables can be found in the appendix, tables A6 and A7. Results are largely unchanged 
from our baseline specification, though the team fixed effects variant of our dismissals model 
when taking out promoted teams shows some evidence of a bump to performance early in 
the new coach’s tenure. By excluding newly promoted teams, who are likely to be lower in 
the table and perhaps struggling to adapt to the higher division, and thus a new coach will 
find it harder to have any impact. This is short lived however, and so the main interpretation 







Using a large linked employer-employee data set for professional football in four countries 
we tackle the endogeneity of leadership change so as to evaluate the effects of changing a 
Head Coach on team performance. The professional football setting is useful in trying to 
isolate the causal impact of leadership on organisational performance, partly because the 
industry does not usually suffer from the exogenous shocks that afflict many other industries 
which make it harder to attribute performance change to management. The setting also means 
principals who hire and fire their managers - Head Coaches in this setting - benefit from 
quick and frequent updating of firm performance because football teams tend to play one or 
two games per week during the football season.  
 
Even though there is a strong theoretical argument to suggest that leadership changes in 
football could, and should make a difference, our estimates using entropy balancing fail to 
show any consistent gains to performance when compared to unconstrained counterfactual 
scenarios in which teams suffer similar runs of form but do not immediately dismiss their 
Head Coach. The finding is largely in keeping with other studies which suggest regression 
to the mean can explain the lack of sustained positive effects of Head Coach changes on 
football team performance.  
 
However, we find a strong exception to this conventional result. We estimate what is likely 
to be an upper bound of the effect of managerial change by examining the effects of a Coach 
change among teams who make no subsequent coaching change in the 20 games after making 
a change. Using these constrained spells, we find teams can experience positive returns after 
a dismissal of between 0.04-0.1 points per game. Even though the magnitude is rather small 
in a sporting sense, this could well prove the difference between relegation and staying up or 
qualifying for a European competition or not which are undoubted signs of success. We 
believe this finding highlights the importance of a good job match, rather than continually 
changing coaches.  
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In contrast, we find little evidence of performance effects following a Head Coach voluntarily 
quitting, though some longer-term effects are present in our ‘clean’ follow up spells. These 
findings are consistent with economic theory as laid out by Farber (1999). Dismissals are 
triggered by principals (team owners) rather than agents (employed coaches). The dismissal 
is itself triggered by poor team performance which is a signal of a bad job match. The owner 
uses his acquired information on the Head Coach’s ability and productivity to terminate the 
relationship and aims to secure a better job match with a new hire. Quits are triggered by the 
agent rather than the principal with the departing Coach seeking better opportunities 
elsewhere (which include switching to a different job as well as different employer). Given 
that the job match was satisfactory to the employer (team owner) without consideration of 
the Coach’s outside options then the best the employer can do is to replace the Coach with a 
job match that is just as good as the previous one. Our results show that team performance is 
neither improved nor impaired by Head Coach succession following a quit, suggesting that 
job matches between teams and voluntarily departing coaches were, on average, efficient. 
Nevertheless, longer term performance improvements are still possible because of a learning 
process.  
 
As to why we see some differing effects in the short run and in the longer run, depending on 
specification, we conjecture that two effects could explain this. In the short run, there is a 
motivational effect of a new Head Coach where players are keen to impress the new leader. 
Recall that most teams that fire a Head Coach do so after experiencing a decline in 
performance. Given that it takes time to reequip a playing squad, the existing players have a 
time window in which to impress the incoming Head Coach to avoid being dropped or 
transferred. This would explain any upturns in form we observe during some specifications. 
In the medium to longer term, new coaches have to learn about their new team and its 
infrastructure very quickly given pressures to deliver good results. Many will have studied 
the team’s attributes from afar but will have little to no first-hand experience of working at 
the club. There is a quick learning process as incoming coaches discern which management 
practices work best for their new employers.  
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We note as a point for further research that our results do not entirely support the conjecture 
of a market for mediocre managerial talent advanced by Tervio (2009) and Peeters et al. 
(2016). If most coaches were mediocre then we would not observe any positive effects on 
team performance that we find from cases of fired coaches. It is possible that a Head Coach 
who appears mediocre at one club can be successful at another. Put another way, the value 
of a job match varies across clubs and each club has an idiosyncratic element in this value. 
A poorly performing club will tend to draw its hiring from the lower end of the ability 
distribution but such a coach can nevertheless help improve team performance.     
 
Further work is needed to investigate heterogeneity of Head Coach effects on team 
performance, since coaches themselves are likely to be heterogeneous in ability (Peeters et 
al, 2016). Even if our estimates, and indeed estimates of past work, yield low or zero mean 
effects, there may well be some positive, some zero and some negative effects and it is worth 
probing into where and how these occur and of course whether there are systematic patterns 
to the positive and negative effects. Further work is also needed to evaluate estimates of Head 
Coach effects broken down by each league separately so as to establish any differences in 
effects of Head Coach firings across countries. 
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Table A1: Unweighted OLS Estimates (Dismissals) 
 
 no FE team FE season FE N Adj. R2   





1 -0.007 (0.037) 0.002 (0.038) -0.007 (0.037) 74,718 0.107 0.118 0.107 
2 0.035 (0.027) 0.038 (0.027) 0.035 (0.027) 74,516 0.082 0.089 0.082 
3 0.040* (0.022) 0.036* (0.022) 0.040* (0.022) 74,311 0.110 0.118 0.110 
4 0.030 (0.019) 0.023 (0.019) 0.031 (0.019) 74,106 0.121 0.134 0.122 
5 0.012 (0.017) 0.001 (0.017) 0.012 (0.017) 73,901 0.141 0.159 0.141 
6 0.005 (0.016) -0.008 (0.015) 0.005 (0.016) 73,697 0.154 0.179 0.155 
7 -0.001 (0.015) -0.016 (0.015) -0.001 (0.015) 73,493 0.170 0.200 0.170 
8 0.002 (0.014) -0.014 (0.014) 0.002 (0.014) 73,286 0.183 0.219 0.183 
9 -0.006 (0.014) -0.022* (0.013) -0.005 (0.014) 73,078 0.196 0.238 0.196 
10 0.002 (0.013) -0.015 (0.012) 0.003 (0.013) 72,869 0.208 0.256 0.208 
11 0.005 (0.012) -0.013 (0.012) 0.005 (0.012) 72,661 0.218 0.272 0.219 
12 0.002 (0.012) -0.018 (0.011) 0.002 (0.012) 72,454 0.228 0.287 0.229 
13 0.007 (0.012) -0.012 (0.011) 0.008 (0.012) 72,246 0.237 0.301 0.238 
14 0.009 (0.011) -0.011 (0.010) 0.010 (0.011) 72,039 0.245 0.314 0.245 
15 0.013 (0.012) -0.008 (0.010) 0.014 (0.012) 71,831 0.251 0.326 0.251 
16 0.014 (0.011) -0.007 (0.010) 0.015 (0.011) 71,624 0.257 0.337 0.257 
17 0.019 (0.011) -0.004 (0.010) 0.019* (0.011) 71,418 0.261 0.348 0.262 
18 0.020* (0.011) -0.003 (0.010) 0.020* (0.011) 71,213 0.265 0.357 0.266 
19 0.026** (0.011) 0.003 (0.010) 0.026** (0.011) 71,007 0.268 0.365 0.269 
20 0.026** (0.011) 0.002 (0.010) 0.026** (0.011) 70,803 0.270 0.373 0.271 







Table A2: Unweighted OLS Estimates (Quits) 
 
 no FE team FE season FE N Adj. R2   





1 -0.058 (0.047) -0.077* (0.046) -0.059 (0.047) 74,038 0.107 0.118 0.107 
2 -0.045 (0.039) -0.050 (0.039) -0.046 (0.039) 73,840 0.082 0.089 0.082 
3 -0.025 (0.036) -0.028 (0.036) -0.026 (0.036) 73,637 0.111 0.119 0.111 
4 -0.022 (0.030) -0.024 (0.030) -0.023 (0.030) 73,433 0.122 0.134 0.122 
5 -0.020 (0.028) -0.022 (0.027) -0.021 (0.028) 73,229 0.142 0.159 0.142 
6 -0.003 (0.026) -0.004 (0.026) -0.004 (0.026) 73,027 0.155 0.179 0.155 
7 0.004 (0.026) 0.003 (0.025) 0.003 (0.026) 72,827 0.170 0.200 0.170 
8 -0.001 (0.026) -0.002 (0.026) -0.001 (0.026) 72,623 0.183 0.220 0.183 
9 -0.001 (0.024) -0.003 (0.024) -0.002 (0.024) 72,419 0.196 0.239 0.196 
10 -0.010 (0.024) -0.013 (0.023) -0.011 (0.024) 72,217 0.208 0.256 0.208 
11 -0.013 (0.022) -0.016 (0.021) -0.014 (0.022) 72,010 0.219 0.273 0.219 
12 -0.003 (0.021) -0.006 (0.020) -0.004 (0.021) 71,806 0.229 0.288 0.229 
13 0.002 (0.020) -0.002 (0.019) 0.001 (0.020) 71,603 0.238 0.302 0.238 
14 -0.000 (0.018) -0.003 (0.018) -0.001 (0.019) 71,400 0.245 0.315 0.246 
15 -0.006 (0.017) -0.009 (0.017) -0.007 (0.018) 71,193 0.252 0.327 0.252 
16 -0.005 (0.017) -0.008 (0.016) -0.005 (0.017) 70,990 0.258 0.338 0.258 
17 -0.009 (0.017) -0.013 (0.016) -0.010 (0.017) 70,788 0.263 0.349 0.263 
18 -0.009 (0.016) -0.012 (0.015) -0.010 (0.016) 70,587 0.267 0.358 0.267 
19 -0.013 (0.016) -0.017 (0.015) -0.014 (0.016) 70,387 0.270 0.367 0.270 
20 -0.013 (0.015) -0.017 (0.014) -0.013 (0.015) 70,182 0.272 0.375 0.273 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses (clustered at the Team level) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
Table A3: Multinomial Logistic Regression, Determinants of Exits 
      
VARIABLES Dismissal Quit 
Team Performance   
Surprise t-1 -0.312*** -0.123** 
 (0.035) (0.051) 
Surprise t-2 to t-5 -0.155*** -0.130*** 
 (0.024) (0.036) 
Surprise t-6 to t-10 -0.024 -0.035 
 (0.024) (0.035) 
Mean Points Prev 10 Games -0.957*** -0.271 
 (0.189) (0.264) 
Position -0.031*** -0.048*** 
 (0.011) (0.019) 
Position Squared 0.001** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Last Season Position 0.002 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.003) 
Coach Characteristics   
Tenure -0.002** 0.006*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
Experience -0.039*** -0.019 
 (0.008) (0.014) 
Age -0.007 -0.302*** 
 (0.057) (0.087) 
Age Squared 0.000 0.003*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) 
N Prev HC Jobs 0.050*** 0.041* 
 (0.014) (0.022) 
Internal Appointment 0.025 -0.428** 
 (0.115) (0.198) 
Previous Promotion -0.265*** 0.048 
 (0.076) (0.122) 
Previous Cup -0.226** 0.275* 
 (0.103) (0.143) 
Previous Relegation 0.196** -0.266** 
 (0.079) (0.134) 
Ex Player -0.218** -0.486*** 
 (0.109) (0.181) 
Season Progress   
Proportion of Games Remaining 4.983*** -0.777 
 (0.652) (1.419) 
Proportion of Games Remaining Squared -5.059*** 0.373 
 (0.638) (1.425) 
Last Game of Season 4.638*** 5.270*** 
 (0.166) (0.299) 
   
Observations 66,157 66,157 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
Table A4: Entropy Balancing (Dismissals) 
 
 
 Mean Variance Skewness 
 Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Unweighted Weighted 
 Treatment Control Control Treatment Control Control Treatment Control Control 
Surprise t-1 -0.4482 0.02179 -0.4481 1.076 1.438 1.075 0.9632 0.251 0.9632 
Surprise t-2 to t-5 -1.097 0.08274 -1.097 4.764 5.618 4.763 0.4275 0.1144 0.4274 
Surprise t-6 to t-10 -0.7296 0.09391 -0.7296 5.765 7.024 5.764 0.3676 0.09937 0.3675 
Mean Points Prev 10 Games 1.069 1.401 1.069 0.1722 0.228 0.1722 0.5912 0.2315 0.5919 
Position 17.1 19.99 17.09 162.7 156.6 162.7 0.2108 0.2828 0.2119 
Position Squared 454.8 556 454.8 238663 315283 238643 0.954 0.8982 0.9542 
Last Season Position 30.08 28.36 30.08 516.1 477.8 516.1 0.1102 0.2905 0.1105 
Tenure 38.85 44.61 38.85 1126 2225 1125 1.903 2.696 1.903 
Experience 11.46 11.47 11.45 63.38 59.25 63.37 0.7147 0.7602 0.7151 
Age 49.22 48.42 49.21 45.65 43.21 45.65 0.3663 0.3959 0.3677 
Age Squared 2468 2388 2468 468590 430630 468551 0.7298 0.754 0.731 
N Prev HC Jobs 4.877 4.385 4.876 17.82 15.06 17.82 1.16 1.283 1.16 
Internal Appointment 0.1367 0.1386 0.1369 0.1181 0.1194 0.1181 2.115 2.092 2.113 
Previous Promotion 0.4981 0.5254 0.4981 0.2502 0.2494 0.25 0.007648 -0.1016 0.007628 
Previous Cup 0.1396 0.1959 0.1398 0.1202 0.1575 0.1202 2.08 1.532 2.078 
Previous Relegation 0.3184 0.2678 0.3186 0.2172 0.1961 0.2171 0.7799 1.049 0.7785 
Ex Player 0.1338 0.1604 0.134 0.116 0.1347 0.1161 2.151 1.851 2.149 
Proportion of Games Remaining 0.3355 0.489 0.3354 0.09008 0.07989 0.09007 0.2687 0.01582 0.2694 
Proportion of Games Remaining Squared 0.2025 0.319 0.2026 0.0559 0.08237 0.05589 1.044 0.6702 1.043 
Last Game of Season 0.3193 0.01488 0.3196 0.2176 0.01465 0.2175 0.7751 8.015 0.7738 
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Table A5: Entropy Balancing (Quits) 
 Mean Variance Skewness 
 Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Unweighted Weighted Unweighted Unweighted Weighted 
 Treatment Control Control Treatment Control Control Treatment Control Control 
Surprise t-1 -0.08757 0.02179 -0.08753 1.379 1.438 1.378 0.415 0.251 0.4149 
Surprise t-2 to t-5 -0.3931 0.08274 -0.3929 4.969 5.618 4.968 0.2405 0.1144 0.2404 
Surprise t-6 to t-10 -0.08577 0.09391 -0.08579 7.511 7.024 7.508 0.2257 0.09937 0.2257 
Mean Points Prev 10 Games 1.319 1.401 1.319 0.2627 0.228 0.2626 0.4913 0.2315 0.4937 
Position 18.06 19.99 18.05 156.4 156.6 156.4 0.4881 0.2828 0.4909 
Position Squared 482.2 556 482.1 296922 315283 296846 1.095 0.8982 1.096 
Last Season Position 27.29 28.36 27.29 468.7 477.8 468.5 0.4341 0.2905 0.4353 
Tenure 64.29 44.61 64.26 2925 2225 2924 2.58 2.696 2.581 
Experience 12.58 11.47 12.58 71.22 59.25 71.2 0.826 0.7602 0.8274 
Age 49.44 48.42 49.43 51.95 43.21 51.94 0.5006 0.3959 0.5055 
Age Squared 2496 2388 2495 549883 430630 549779 0.8332 0.754 0.8376 
N Prev HC Jobs 4.797 4.385 4.795 17.23 15.06 17.23 1.202 1.283 1.203 
Internal Appointment 0.1038 0.1386 0.1041 0.09327 0.1194 0.09328 2.597 2.092 2.592 
Previous Promotion 0.5598 0.5254 0.5595 0.247 0.2494 0.2465 -0.241 -0.1016 -0.2396 
Previous Cup 0.2506 0.1959 0.2512 0.1882 0.1575 0.1881 1.151 1.532 1.148 
Previous Relegation 0.2415 0.2678 0.2421 0.1836 0.1961 0.1835 1.208 1.049 1.204 
Ex Player 0.1264 0.1604 0.1268 0.1107 0.1347 0.1107 2.248 1.851 2.243 
Proportion of Games Remaining 0.1039 0.489 0.1037 0.05434 0.07989 0.05444 2.195 0.01582 2.2 
Proportion of Games Remaining Squared 0.06501 0.319 0.06519 0.03024 0.08237 0.03035 3.003 0.6702 3.001 
Last Game of Season 0.772 0.01488 0.771 0.1764 0.01465 0.1765 -1.297 8.015 -1.29 
Table A6: Excluding Relegations 
 Dismissals  Quits 
 no FE team FE N Adj. R2  no FE team FE N Adj. R2  
Mean Points 
Next ... Games Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e.  No FE 
Team 
FE Coeff s.e. Coeff   No FE 
Team 
FE 
1 -0.027 (0.048) -0.003 (0.045) 59,933 0.089 0.163 0.042 (0.072) -0.005 (0.068) 59,449 0.156 0.303 
2 0.036 (0.035) 0.033 (0.033) 59,781 0.061 0.129 0.023 (0.054) 0.009 (0.050) 59,300 0.100 0.260 
3 0.049* (0.029) 0.039 (0.027) 59,627 0.078 0.151 0.035 (0.046) 0.016 (0.042) 59,148 0.105 0.272 
4 0.045* (0.026) 0.034 (0.024) 59,473 0.075 0.158 0.018 (0.041) 0.008 (0.036) 58,994 0.109 0.288 
5 0.019 (0.023) 0.009 (0.021) 59,318 0.091 0.177 0.015 (0.037) -0.005 (0.033) 58,840 0.117 0.298 
6 0.009 (0.022) -0.000 (0.020) 59,163 0.097 0.201 0.026 (0.034) 0.008 (0.030) 58,687 0.125 0.319 
7 -0.005 (0.020) -0.015 (0.018) 59,009 0.109 0.218 0.023 (0.032) 0.002 (0.028) 58,535 0.136 0.342 
8 -0.003 (0.019) -0.014 (0.017) 58,853 0.112 0.232 0.017 (0.030) -0.003 (0.026) 58,380 0.149 0.379 
9 -0.012 (0.019) -0.026 (0.017) 58,696 0.119 0.249 0.010 (0.029) -0.013 (0.025) 58,227 0.149 0.384 
10 0.002 (0.018) -0.014 (0.016) 58,537 0.133 0.263 0.005 (0.028) -0.020 (0.024) 58,073 0.172 0.414 
11 0.001 (0.017) -0.012 (0.015) 58,378 0.136 0.275 -0.007 (0.027) -0.032 (0.023) 57,915 0.180 0.428 
12 -0.004 (0.017) -0.016 (0.014) 58,217 0.141 0.288 -0.000 (0.026) -0.025 (0.022) 57,757 0.192 0.443 
13 0.005 (0.016) -0.007 (0.014) 58,057 0.143 0.302 0.007 (0.025) -0.019 (0.021) 57,600 0.196 0.455 
14 0.008 (0.016) -0.003 (0.014) 57,896 0.153 0.316 0.007 (0.025) -0.018 (0.021) 57,443 0.214 0.473 
15 0.009 (0.016) -0.002 (0.013) 57,735 0.155 0.331 -0.001 (0.024) -0.021 (0.020) 57,282 0.216 0.471 
16 0.012 (0.015) 0.001 (0.013) 57,572 0.158 0.340 -0.001 (0.024) -0.022 (0.020) 57,123 0.224 0.480 
17 0.017 (0.015) 0.004 (0.013) 57,411 0.162 0.345 -0.006 (0.023) -0.025 (0.019) 56,964 0.228 0.491 
18 0.015 (0.015) 0.001 (0.012) 57,250 0.164 0.350 -0.005 (0.023) -0.017 (0.019) 56,806 0.244 0.502 
19 0.020 (0.014) 0.006 (0.012) 57,087 0.166 0.359 -0.008 (0.022) -0.020 (0.019) 56,649 0.247 0.511 
20 0.019 (0.014) 0.004 (0.012) 56,925 0.165 0.369 -0.007 (0.022) -0.020 (0.018) 56,488 0.248 0.521 










Table A7: Excluding Promotions 
 Dismissals  Quits 
 no FE team FE N Adj. R2  no FE team FE N Adj. R2  
Mean Points 
Next ... Games Coeff s.e. Coeff s.e.  No FE 
Team 
FE Coeff s.e. Coeff   No FE 
Team 
FE 
1 0.009 (0.047) 0.037 (0.045) 59,919 0.088 0.154 0.015 (0.072) -0.051 (0.068) 59,415 0.158 0.309 
2 0.049 (0.034) 0.046 (0.032) 59,766 0.065 0.123 0.014 (0.054) -0.004 (0.051) 59,265 0.103 0.252 
3 0.070** (0.028) 0.059** (0.027) 59,611 0.076 0.140 0.036 (0.047) 0.014 (0.042) 59,112 0.113 0.283 
4 0.062** (0.025) 0.052** (0.024) 59,456 0.072 0.140 0.008 (0.041) -0.002 (0.036) 58,958 0.122 0.299 
5 0.039* (0.022) 0.027 (0.021) 59,300 0.085 0.158 0.009 (0.037) -0.016 (0.033) 58,803 0.136 0.314 
6 0.025 (0.021) 0.012 (0.020) 59,144 0.089 0.178 0.025 (0.035) 0.005 (0.030) 58,649 0.136 0.336 
7 0.009 (0.020) -0.005 (0.018) 58,988 0.096 0.195 0.026 (0.033) 0.001 (0.028) 58,496 0.146 0.354 
8 0.009 (0.019) -0.005 (0.017) 58,829 0.100 0.202 0.021 (0.031) -0.006 (0.026) 58,339 0.158 0.389 
9 0.003 (0.019) -0.015 (0.017) 58,669 0.108 0.219 0.017 (0.029) -0.016 (0.024) 58,182 0.162 0.395 
10 0.015 (0.018) -0.003 (0.016) 58,507 0.122 0.234 0.012 (0.028) -0.023 (0.023) 58,025 0.180 0.424 
11 0.011 (0.017) -0.003 (0.015) 58,345 0.125 0.248 0.000 (0.027) -0.036 (0.023) 57,864 0.182 0.429 
12 0.003 (0.016) -0.012 (0.014) 58,182 0.130 0.260 0.008 (0.027) -0.024 (0.022) 57,704 0.188 0.443 
13 0.007 (0.016) -0.007 (0.014) 58,020 0.130 0.272 0.012 (0.026) -0.021 (0.021) 57,545 0.191 0.454 
14 0.011 (0.016) -0.004 (0.014) 57,858 0.139 0.284 0.015 (0.025) -0.019 (0.021) 57,386 0.203 0.468 
15 0.012 (0.015) -0.002 (0.013) 57,695 0.142 0.299 0.008 (0.025) -0.019 (0.020) 57,223 0.206 0.469 
16 0.012 (0.015) -0.003 (0.013) 57,530 0.142 0.307 0.010 (0.024) -0.017 (0.020) 57,062 0.214 0.475 
17 0.015 (0.015) 0.001 (0.013) 57,367 0.149 0.313 0.006 (0.024) -0.020 (0.019) 56,902 0.220 0.486 
18 0.015 (0.014) -0.001 (0.012) 57,204 0.150 0.319 0.009 (0.023) -0.013 (0.019) 56,742 0.236 0.497 
19 0.021 (0.014) 0.004 (0.012) 57,039 0.152 0.328 0.005 (0.023) -0.017 (0.019) 56,583 0.238 0.505 
20 0.022 (0.014) 0.004 (0.012) 56,875 0.154 0.339 0.008 (0.023) -0.016 (0.019) 56,420 0.239 0.514 
Cluster Robust Standard Errors in Parentheses (clustered at the Team level) *p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01 
 
